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TWO VISIONS OF JUSTICE: FEDERAL
COURTS AT A CROSSROADS*
FRANK ASKIN**
For some time now, the conservative legal movement has waged
a concerted campaign to exalt a doctrine it refers to as "judicial
restraint" and to demonize that which it terms "judicial activism."
At the end of the 1995 term, Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas enunciated one of the clearest statements yet of the aims
and arguments of that movement. In his concurring opinion in
Missouri v. Jenkins,1 Justice Thomas openly challenged the un-
derlying rationale of the historic Brown v. Board of Education2
school desegregation decision.3 He also alleged that the Supreme
Court began a trend in the mid-1950s toward a vast usurpation of
legislative power in an effort to enforce constitutional rights.4
* This article was adapted from a speech presented by Professor Frank Askin at the
annual Supreme Court press briefing by the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") on
September 27, 1995. The footnotes have been provided by the staff of the St. John's Journal
of Legal Commentary.
** Professor of law and Robert Knowlton Scholar at Rutgers School of Law, Newark,
New Jersey; member of the National Board since 1969 and General Counsel of the ACLU
since 1976.
1 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2061 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see id. at 495. Brown stands for the proposition that racial segre-
gation in schools violates equal protection as it is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id.
3 See Jenkins 115 S. Ct. at 2067, 2071-72 (asserting generally that scholastic achieve-
ment of black students is not affected by integration); see also id. at 2065. Justice Thomas
states:
'Racial isolation' itself is not a harm; only state-enforced segregation is. After all, if
separation itself is a harm, and if integration therefore is the only way that blacks can
receive a proper education, then there must be something inferior about blacks. Under
this theory, segregation injures blacks because blacks, when left on their own, cannot
achieve.
Id.
4 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (advocating racial integration in schools to promote educa-
tional opportunities for all students); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977)
(approving remedial or compensatory education programs paid for by State to schoolchil-
dren subjected to past acts of de jure segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 37-42 (1971) (granting federal courts broad discretion to order busing,
set racial targets for school populations, and alter attendance zones); United States v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235-36 (1969) (allowing federal courts to
desegregate faculty staff members according to specific mathematical ratios); cf Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978) (using structural injunctions to supervise mental hospi-
tal); Flaherty v. Thomas S., 902 F.2d 250, 255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951 (1990)
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In Jenkins, a slim majority of the Court struck down orders ap-
proved by two lower federal courts which required a Kansas City
school district to take specific remedial action in response to a
long-standing desegregation order.5 Although Justice Thomas
purported to speak for no one but himself,6 his concurrence articu-
lated a broad and sweeping rationale not only for the outcome in
Jenkins, but also for a number of other decisions in recent years in
which a conservative majority7 of the Court has sharply curtailed
the authority of federal courts to shape remedies which could ef-
fectively ameliorate constitutional violations.' Justice Thomas'
opinion in Jenkins enunciates a flawed doctrine which he and the
radical right for which he speaks would impose upon our constitu-
tional jurisprudence.
Central to Justice Thomas' attack was the notion that the
Supreme Court had manipulated ancient principles of equity as
practiced by the English Courts of Chancery to impose its own
political judgments on the body politic.9 He raged over the fact
that the Justices, usually under the guidance of Justice William
Brennan, Jr., had creatively invoked equitable principles to pro-
vide effective remedies for otherwise intractable constitutional
violations. 1°
It is true that decisions made by the Supreme Court beginning
in the mid-1950s brought about significant changes in America's
social structure. Most notable among these changes were the end
(permitting relief to hospitalized mental patients for unconstitutional conditions imposed
in mental hospital).
5 Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055-56. The Court held that lower courts tried to achieve indi-
rectly that which they could not achieve directly; namely, the courts imposed interdistrict
goals which went beyond the identified intra-district violation, thereby going beyond the
nature of Constitutional violation. Id. at 2051.
6 Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2061 (1995).
7 See generally Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent Juris-
prudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. Rsv. 329, 329 (1995) (commenting on increasingly
conservative swing of Supreme Court over last 20 years).
8 See Milliken, 418 at 751-53; see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 498-99 (1992);
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991); cf Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S.
265, 279-80 (1990).
9 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2066-67. Justice Thomas cites several cases in which equita-
ble remedial powers were expanded. Id. Specifically, Justice Thomas points to those deci-
sions in which the Court sought to remedy segregation by forcing blacks and whites to be
represented in equal numbers. Id. See generally supra, note 4 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Court's efforts to enforce constitutional rights).
10 Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2067. Justice Thomas further argues that judges have disre-
garded the inherent limitations on their authority in their attempts to reconstruct institu-
tions and bureaucracies. Id.
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of official racial segregation in schools and elsewhere; 1 the reap-
portionment of federal and state legislative bodies to reflect the
principle of "one person one vote;"12 a vast expansion of free
speech law which hastened the demise of the repressive McCarthy
Era; 1 3 the reform of archaic penal 4 and mental institutions;' 5 the
further elevation of the historic constitutional wall designed to
separate church and state;16 and the imposition of strict due pro-
cess requirements on government bureaucrats in order to guaran-
tee individuals a public hearing before their rights could seriously
be impaired. 7
Justice Thomas obviously views these developments as a per-
version of our constitutional system and a violation of the doc-
trines of separation of powers and states' rights.' 8 To support this
position, he cited the Federalist Papers, focusing primarily on
those writings of Alexander Hamilton intended to allay fears that
federal equity courts might abuse their discretion and override
statutory and common law. 19
11 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954).
12 See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). The Court stated that "[the conception
of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address,
to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing--one
person, one vote." Id.
13 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 496 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965).
14 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that prison authorities' failure
to provide for inmates' medical needs constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment").
15 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (finding that Due Process Clause
established that government must provide safe conditions for confinement of involuntarily
committed mentally retarded individuals); Parnham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 587 (1974) (hold-
ing that Due Process Clause requires child to have benefit of neutral fact finder in deter-
mining whether child should be committed at parents' insistence).
16 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (creating three part test to avoid
violation of Establishment Clause); see also Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 120
(1982) (finding violation of Establishment Clause in zoning regulation granting power of
veto to religious organizations for any business located within 500 feet of church premises).
17 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1970).
18 Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2062 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas noted that the "exercise of ... authority has trampled upon principles of federal-
ism and the separation of powers and has freed courts to pursue other agendas unrelated to
the narrow purpose of precisely remedying a constitutional harm." Id.
19 See generally THm FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (defending need for equity
jurisdiction because litigation between individuals must necessarily contain elements of
"fraud, accident, trust or hardship" which could not be fairly decided within "legal jurisdic-
tion" but required "equity jurisdiction"); Tim FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (as-
suring anti-federalists that U.S. courts would be permitted to use equity jurisdiction only
in extraordinary circumstances).
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Curiously, Thomas' concurrence ignores the Civil War and the
ensuing wartime amendments.20 Justice Thomas writes as though
constitutional history ended in 1789, and the constitutional
revolution of 1865 never occurred. He seemingly forgets that this
nation fought a bloody war to curb the authority of the states and
subsequently amended the Constitution to guarantee against fu-
ture abuses of citizens in the name of states' rights. The resultant
Fourteenth Amendment categorically asserts that "[n]o State shall
... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person the equal protection of the,
laws."2 1
Additionally, the separation of powers so nostalgically yearned
for by Justice Thomas, appears to be nothing more than the power
of the legislative and executive branches to ignore the constitu-
tionally conferred rights of individuals. The law of this country
has clearly been otherwise since Marbury v. Madison.22 That
landmark decision requires the judicial branch to assure that the
other branches of government adhere to constitutional restraints
in their exercise of power.23
Justice Thomas' concurrence also reinvented Anglo-American
jurisprudence. He correctly asserts that early Americans as well
as English democrats were concerned that free-wheeling equity
courts might create and enforce their own legal norms.24 Those
concerns, however, focused on the abuse of "substantive" jurisdic-
tion by courts of equity. Justice Thomas concentrates his modern
criticisms on the exercise of the "remedial" powers of courts of eq-
uity to provide effective remedies for the enforcement of legal
rights.
20 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Thirteenth Amendment states, in relevant part,
that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist within the United States"
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part,
that [no] State ... [shall] ... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law" Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. The Fifteenth Amendment asserts, in rele-
vant part, that "[t]he rights of the citizenry to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
Id. (emphasis added).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
22 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
23 Id. at 176 (finding that act of Congress contrary to Constitution could not be law,
thereby establishing concept of judicial review).
24 See 3 WiLLAM BLACKSTONE, ColmrAsRmS 436, 440-41 (1768). See generally Federal
Farmer No. 15 (Jan. 18, 1788) in THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 322 (H. Storing ed.
1981).
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The idea of equity as part of a jurisprudential system is not a
recent invention.25 The theory dates back, at least, to the teach-
ings of Aristotle, which define equity as "justice that goes beyond
written law."26 Speaking of the need for "rectification of legal jus-
tice," Aristotle wrote27 that "law is always a general statement,
yet there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general
statement .... 28
In the sixteenth century, Parliament warned the British Courts
of Chancery not to usurp the common law when it offered ade-
quate remedies.2 9 Where common law remedies were inadequate,
however, Anglo-American legal traditions have long recognized
the authority of the equity courts to assert jurisdiction and to pro-
vide equitable relief.30
That premise of equity's remedial jurisdiction is the source of
authority for the modern injunction.31 When traditional legal rem-
edies of compensatory damages did not provide full relief, the eq-
uity court was authorized to require wrongdoers to change their
behavior upon threat of jail for contempt.32 Today, federal judges
25 See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 214 (1818) (applying equity princi-
ples to real property ejectment proceeding); Edward D. Re, The Roman Contribution to the
Common Law, 39 Loy. L. REv 295, 308-09 (1993) (explaining genesis of English equity
principles).
26 See GARY L. McDOWELL, EQurry AND THE CONsTrUTION: THE SUPREME COURT, EQUi-
TABLE RELIEF, AND PUBLIC POLICY 16-17 (1982).
27 See ARIsTOTLE, NICHOMACEAN ETms, Book V, ch. 4, 8, cited in, THE POCKET ARIS-
TOTLE 158-59, 160-274 (Justin D. Kaplan ed. & W.D. Ross trans., Wash. Sq. Press, 1965).
Aristotle's Nichomean Ethics consists of 10 chapters offering a discourse on moral, intellec-
tual and political means of achieving happiness, the ultimate goal of humanity. Id.
28 Id. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the "Infancy Law Doc-
trine": From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 481, 522-23(1995).
29 See Brent McKnight, How Shall We Then Reason? The Historical Setting of Equity, 45
MERCER L. REv. 919, 932-33 n.15 (1994) (discussing conflict between English Parliament
and Chancery Courts).
30 See Mertens v. Hewitt Association, 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2068 (1993) (discussing appropri-
ate forms of equitable relief); Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 40 (1989) (dis-
tinguishing legal causes of action from equitable causes of action); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 624-25 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing
"well settled" principle of fashioning equitable relief where other remedies are inadequate).
31 See Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 145, 153-62
(1995) (discussing role of injunction as equitable remedy); Donald H. Ziegler, Rights Re-
quire Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 665, 666-69 (1987) (discussing federal court authority to fashion rights and
remedies); see also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 505 (1959) (stating
that injunction is traditionally equitable remedy available where legal remedies are
inadequate).
32 See Clark v. Coye, 60 F.3d 600, 604-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (disregarding injunction re-
quires contempt sanctions to conform conduct); Pro-Choice Network of N.Y. v. Walker, 994
F.2d 989, 992 (2d Cir. 1993) (advocating contempt sanctions as coercive remedy to conform
behavior); N.A. Sales Co. v. Chapman Indus. Corp., 736 F.2d 854, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1984)
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who preside over a merged system of law and equity achieve simi-
lar results to those of early equity courts by exercising those tradi-
tional powers.33 Historically, it must be conceded that even this
remedial power of the Chancellor (or equity judge) did not go un-
challenged.3 4 For example, nineteenth century British critics de-
rided the discretion of the equity courts to enforce legal rights and
complained that the only standard by which to measure its au-
thority was the size of the "chancellor's foot."35
In one sense, when Justice Thomas condemns modern Supreme
Court decisions for allowing federal equity judges to shape consti-
tutional remedies that work, 36 he is merely echoing ancient criti-
ques of well-established Anglo-American remedial law. 7 Justice
Thomas is incorrect, however, when he suggests that the modern
federal injunction which flourished through the years of the War-
ren Court3 8 represented a perversion of our legal tradition. The
(demonstrating how wilful violation of injunction results in contempt sanction as well as
treble damages).
33 See FED. R. Crv. P. 1 (abolishing distinctions between actions in law and equity). Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure Number 1 states, in relevant part, that "[tihese rules govern
the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether
cognizable as cases at law or in equity... ." Id.; see also Beacon Theaters, 359 U.S. at 505-
508 (noting federal court jurisdiction to try cases at law and equity within same proceed-
ing). But see Bereslavsky v. Caffey, 161 F.2d 499, 500 (2d Cir. 1947) (noting federal proce-
dural rules do not eradicate substantive distinctions between legal and equitable
remedies).
34 See NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting modem
equity judge does not have limitless discretion of medieval Lord Chancellor to grant or
withhold remedy); California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295 (1990) (asserting neces-
sity for equity judge to be flexible rather than rigid); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 42-43
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (establishing that although federal courts have histori-
cally had broad discretion to fashion equitable remedies, they may not fashion remedies at
law without congressional authorization).
35 See JoHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 43 (Frederick Pollack ed. 1927) (1689). The traditional
assessment of equitable remedy is not uniform and has been compared to using the 'Chan-
cellor's foot' as a standard of measure in that "[olne Chancellor has a long foot another a
short foot a third an indifferent foot; tis ye same thing in ye Chancellors Conscience." Id.;
see also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 227 (1982) (utilizing 'Chancellor's foot'
analogy to demonstrate that national goals would be frustrated if different results were
produced in similar situations due to court's exercise of discretion).
36 Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2066-71 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expres-
sing view that federal courts have gone to great extremes to provide equitable results).
37 See David McCord, Visions of Habeas, 1994 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 735, 800-01 (discussing
"arch-conservative," "one fair chance" philosophy of Justices Scalia and Thomas in habeas
corpus context); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1269, 1287 (1993) (not-
ing Anglo-american tradition of awarding exemplary damages).
38 Earl Warren was Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1953
through 1969. Court decisions during this period are often acknowledged as broad, flexible
and individualistic. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA.
L. REv. 1141, 1168 n.101 (1988) (dividing Supreme Court doctrine concerning equitable
discretion into three historic periods as well as noting Warren Court's expansion of inter-
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former Dean of Harvard Law School, Roscoe Pound, regarded as
one of the most eminent of modern legal scholars, summarized the
relationship between law and equity as follows:
Equity, after all, is a great supplement to the common law. It
deals with everything all over the whole domain of the com-
mon law. It is a remedial system, really, a great system of
remedies where the common law is not equal to maintaining
the legal rights which it developed and which it recognizes.
After all, it is not merely that equity follows the law. Equity,
in a sense is administering the law, but it is administering it
by different kinds of remedies and within a different atmos-
phere, you might say, by application of those remedies. 39
It may be more than coincidental that these comments were de-
livered to the 1948 New Jersey Constitutional Convention at
which a young lawyer, William J. Brennan, Jr., sat as a member of
the task-force on the judicial article. ° It was the same William
Brennan who was appointed as a Chancery Judge in the New
Jersey Court system in 194941 and later became a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States.42
The arrival of Justice Brennan to the Supreme Court marked
the beginning of the Court's modern application of the ancient tra-
ditions of Anglo-American equity jurisprudence to constitutional
controversies.43 This trend was an attempt to better enable the
federal courts to carry out their historic responsibility of enforcing
the United States Constitution. Frustrated by the slow pace of
constitutionally required school desegregation, the Supreme
Court invoked the Chancellor's truncheon. The Court announced
that federal trial judges were to assert authority as courts of eq-
pretation of statutory remedies); Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L.
REV. 965, 965-66 (1993) (explaining expansion of remedies, particularly in civil rights con-
text, as exemplary of Warren court jurisprudence).
39 State of New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947, Vol. IV, Committee on the
Judiciary Record (1949).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Kim IsAAc EISLER, WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., AND THE DECISIONS THAT TRANS-
FORMED AMERICA 65-69 (1993) (noting Brennan's reluctance to accept appointment to New
Jersey bench).
43 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 203-04 (1962). Justice Brennan wrote for the major-
ity and asserted that the district court had jurisdiction in a case in which the state appor-
tionment statute was challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. He further noted
that federal courts have discretionary power to fashion equitable remedies as they see fit.
Id.
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uity to see that segregation was dismantled "root and branch."44
That mandate led federal judges to assert the prerogatives of eq-
uity courts in other areas to enforce constitutional principles.4 5
The remedial powers of equity armed the federal courts with the
tools necessary to carry out what Justice William Douglas once
characterized as the primary task of "keeping government off the
backs of the people."46
Justice Thomas has thrown down the gauntlet and in so doing
has exposed the legal agenda of the radical right.47 Namely, a pro-
gram apparently intended to insulate bureaucrats from judicial
interference with unconstitutional programs and policies. It is
perfectly appropriate that his views be heard and that he en-
deavor to make those views the law of the land. He should not be
allowed, however, to present his partisan and "result oriented"
doctrines as the only true path, or to paint the constitutional ad-
vances of recent years, particularly those of the Warren Court, as
a perversion of our legal traditions.4"
With fbderal courts at an historic crossroads, it is important not
only that judges and lawyers but also the citizenry at large, under-
stand the dangers inherent in Justice Thomas' views.49 One must
ask whether the federal courts will become bastions of power and
privilege. The alternative is that the courts revert to the role of
44 See Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
45 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2067 (1995).
46 See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 27 (1968); see also Letter from William 0. Doug-
las to William K Johnson (Apr. 24, 1960), in TH DouGLAs LErERs 158 (Melvin I. Urofsky
ed., 1988).
47 See Michael Cominsky, The Real and Imagined Consequences of Senatorial Consent to
Silent Supreme Court Nominees, 11 J.L. & POL. 41, 48 (1995) (noting that Justice Thomas
has joined ranks with Supreme Court's "far right wing"); Christopher Smith & Kimberly A.
Benger, Clouds in the Crystal Ball: Expectations and the Unpredictable Behavior of
Supreme Court Appointees, 27 AKRON L. REV. 115, 124 (1993) (observing that Justice
Thomas was appointed by President Bush with intention of fashioning conservative
Supreme Court); Catherine P. Wells, Clarence Thomas: The Invisible Man, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 117, 123 (1993) (commenting that Justice Thomas' strong conservative position has
caused consternation among leaders of Black community).
48 A. Leon Higginbotham, An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas From a Federal
Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1005, 1012 (1992). Judge Higginbotham cautioned
Justice Thomas to be exceedingly non-partisan and thoughtful before attacking the Warren
Court, civil rights organizations and Justice Thurgood Marshall in future writings. Id.; see
also Wells, supra note 47, at 146 (commenting that Justice Thomas is unlikely to bring
about "progressive change" in civil rights).
49 See Higginbotham, supra note 48, at 1005 (explaining need to make American public
understand challenges faced by Supreme Court Justice Thomas in order to make valid as-
sessment of his work).
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"people's courts,"5 ° fulfilling their duty as the guardian of funda-
mental rights when those rights are abridged or threatened by
any abuse of bureaucratic power.51
50 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 344-89,
430-63, 547-53 (1969) (discussing role of "people's courts" in early American political
thought).
51 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 532 n.124 (1994) (noting that role
of equity courts is to protect public against "legislative excesses"); see also Richard S. Kay,
The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of Constitu-
tional Law, 10 CONST. ComMENT. 329, 350 (1993) (noting Framer's concern about abuse of
government power infringing on individual rights).

